The Anglican Church of Australia
Sydney Diocese
Twenty-one reasons why the case promoted by Sydney PSU Director Lachlan Bryant against Drew cannot and should not be allowed to go to a hearing.
Reason 1: The charges do not allege any form of child abuse, child sexual abuse or grooming. Not only is this in opposition to what the allegations were represented to mean when presented by Sydney PSU director Mr. Bryant to Drew and Pippa, the allegations do not involve any unlawful activity let alone that of abusive behaviour towards or with a child.
Reason 2: The charges were brought after massive and fundamental errors, lies and incompetence on the part of Mr. Bryant. Mr. Bryant, by his barrister has admitted he was in error in his conduct of the first meeting. He has admitted to the Archbishop of Sydney that he made errors in his conduct of the case. Therefore the process was commenced by lies told to Drew and Pippa by the director Sydney PSU and the Director PSU for the dioceses of Bathurst and The Riverina Mr. Peter Barnett and continued with fundamental incompetence and stupidity (if not malice) as a substitute for professional competence. This is NOT excused by inexperience. To allow the director Sydney PSU to continue as Promoter of the charges is a travesty of justice and fair process. It is also a conflict of interest where he has a vital interest in the outcome as he needs to be vindicated in his unwarrantable pursuit and victimisation of Drew and Pippa and their family.
Reason 3: This means that the process of dealing with the allegations and subsequent dealings with the case is fundamentally and fatally flawed. That the process should be continued in the face of this is a disgrace in an organisation dedicated to Christian belief and conduct. The referral to the Professional Standards Committee (‘the PSC’) breached rules of fair process and was also incompetent, and, arguably, only embarked on to try to get Mr. Bryant out of a position where he was facing criticism for his incompetence and for the devastation he had wrought in the lives of Drew, Pippa and their children and the real prospect of claims for compensation for Drew’s loss of livelihood due to his incompetence.
Reason 4: As the charges do not allege any form of child abuse, child sex abuse or grooming, nor any other activity specified in the Discipline Ordinance 2006 (such as adultery and failure to pay debts when they fall due) the use of the disciplinary tribunal process was always inappropriate. The allegations which did not (at first) contain details of harm from what are lawful and moral actions that did not breach any provisions of the Discipline Ordinance 2006 and it’s predecessors nor codes of conduct were never serious enough to warrant any form of process through the PSU at all.
Reason 5: Because the disciplinary tribunal process that was invoked by the PSC (contrary to the earnest pleas of the Archbishop) was based on misrepresentations by Mr. Bryant, again the process was based on lies and, arguably, a concern to vindicate all actions by Mr. Bryant to that point. In recommending to the Archbishop that the allegations should be referred to a tribunal hearing (which made it mandatory for the Archbishop to proceed with this course of action) the members of the PSC demonstrated that they were willing to suspend rational thought and to ‘protect’ Mr. Bryant by pretending that there was a real complaint to be tried.
Reason 6: Because the referral to the PSC was made on the basis that Mr. Bryant had inappropriately and deceitfully characterised Drew’s unconditional apologies (urged on him by Mr. Bryant and Mr. Barnett) as confessions, it was made on the basis of lies, deviousness and deceit. This is disgraceful behaviour by Mr. Bryant.
Reason 7: The referral by the PSC was an abuse of the prescribed process, as, having been presented by what was termed confessions, the proper process according to the Discipline Ordinance 2006 under which the PSC was constituted was itself to recommend punitive and/or protective remedies such as suspension of licence, payment of a fine or making an apology, NOT a recommendation for referral to a disciplinary tribunal. This in itself is another indication that the purpose of the referral was to shut Drew and Pippa up, who by then were making strong complaints to the Archbishop and to the Safe Ministry Board about Mr. Bryant’s incompetence and the abuse of process.
Reason 8: The evidence on which Bryant as Promoter of the charges relies (as disclosed in the two statutory declarations, one by complainant 1 and one by complainant 2) does not prove even on the face of it what Bryant has to prove according to the terms of the charge:
1. That the alleged actions were disgraceful if performed by a youth minister; AND 2. that they caused a scandal or if known would have caused a scandal.
AND
Reason 9: the defence has evidence that defeats the elements of the charges, even if they were proved by the Promoter Mr. Bryant.
There is no evidence from either of the complainants that the alleged actions were not known (where the defence has filed evidence that they were widely known) nor evidence that they did or would have caused a scandal (whereas the defence has filed evidence that they did not cause a scandal).
Reason 10: In respect of Complainant 1 – the case at its highest is that one man is complaining about ordinary lawful actions;
AND
Reason 11: The case at its highest is that one man is complaining about actions that are not immoral;
AND
Reason 12: The case at its highest is that one man is complaining about actions that are not prohibited by the Bible;
AND
Reason 13: The case at its highest is that one man is complaining about actions that are not prohibited by any church legislation or code of conduct either at the time or later.
The tribunal should be very careful not to characterise as abusive (or even disgraceful) lawful actions that are not prohibited by civil or criminal law, nor by any moral code, the Bible, nor any church legislation or code of conduct, for which a person’s reputation can be trashed and whose whole life’s work can be brought into question.
Reason 14: Complainant 1 never did complain about sexual abuse or grooming. And he has admitted to his parents and to a woman of the highest probity that he never thought that the actions involved any sexual intent or quality. Her statutory declaration to that effect has been filed by the defence.
Reason 15: Complainant 1 did not complain about any harm to him from these actions. He had to scramble to put together some story of being ‘uncomfortable’ and not being able to allow his wife to massage his legs (!) when it was pointed out that there was no allegation of harm. This is just ludicrous.
Reason 16: Complainant 1’s complaints relate to actions that occurred in relation to many other members of the youth group as well and about 21 of these have made statutory declarations filed by the defence affirming that they found the actions helpful, that they received physical, mental and psychological support and they were imbued with Christian spiritual development.
Reason 17: This huge response in favour of Drew’ actions as youth minister leaves complainant 1 in the position of being unable to be viewed as other than mentally disabled or otherwise neurotic in bringing the complaints. If the case proceeds to a hearing and the tribunal is forced by the lack of compelling evidence (see above) to dismiss his complaint there is a concern that he is at risk of deterioration to his mental health.
Reason 18: Complainant 1 is now in the position of having instructed his solicitor to inform me that he was the sole instigator of the allegations without taking advice from the PSU as to whether the allegations were founded on the requirements of the Discipline Ordinance 2006. This has robbed him of the ability to claim against Mr. Bryant and others of the church hierarchy for damages or compensation. So that when the tribunal, if it deals with the matter in a proper quasi-judicial manner, is forced to dismiss the charges of complainant 1, then complainant 1 is left without redress for what has been a monumental bungling of the handling of his complaints. He should have been told to go away right from the start, apart from being offered sound advice as to the effect of church disciplinary ordinances and codes of conduct.
Reason 19: Complainant 1 sent defamatory messages including posting on Facebook alleging that Drew was guilty of child sex abuse notwithstanding his agreement, quoted above, that he never thought there was a sexual element to Drew’s actions. This exposes him to Supreme Court proceedings for damages. He and his solicitor have been relying on the church disciplinary tribunal to vindicate complainant 1 by finding that the allegation of child sex abuse was true. For all the reasons stated above this cannot happen, and not least because the charges could not be brought in those terms. Any attempt by the tribunal to do this would be laughed out of court in Supreme Court proceedings. As the Deputy President of the disciplinary tribunal is a retired Acting Judge of the Supreme Court of NSW with a strong judicial reputation, he is not likely to be a party to that, nor indeed the other two members of the tribunal.
Reason 20: Complainant 2 made an allegation that has been challenged as to its veracity by another youth group member from that time. This youth group member has made a statutory declaration which has been filed by the defence. Complainant 2 has provided no independent support for his allegation.
Reason 21: Complainant 2 has made only one other complaint that is challenged by evidence of Drew and Pippa and other youth members. Because of the lack of independent support for his allegations together with positive evidence negating his assertions, Complainant 2 is at risk of being found to be unreliable as to veracity and to have his complaint dismissed.
Undoubtedly on further reflection I will find more reasons, and if so I will set them down for your consideration.
Louise Greentree
16 April 2015